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I. INTRODUCTION
"[F]orced sex between people who already [know] each other" con-
stitutes acquaintance or date rape.' Until recently, people did not con-
sider this type of rape as "real" rape.2 Experts estimate astounding
numbers of reported and unreported stranger and acquaintance rapes.
1. Nancy Gibbs, When Is It Rape?, TIME, June 3, 1991, at 48.
2. See id.; see also Kim L. Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1095,
1100 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: How THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES
WOMEN WHO SAY No (1987)) ("Where the rapist knows his victim, acts alone, and doesn't use a
weapon or brutally beat her, the legal system often treats the rape as if it weren't a rape at all.").
3. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1991, at 179 (In
1989, 94,500 rapes occurred, whereas only 18,954 murders occurred that year.); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIED 247 (1987) (In reported rapes, fifty-five percent of the rapists
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:343
The United States Department of Justice estimated that in 1991 eighty-
three of every 100,000 women in the United States were reported rape
victims.4  In addition, more than ninety percent of rape violations were
acquaintance rapes.5  Approximately fifty-three percent of rape victims
do not report rapes to the police.6
In the United States, jurisdictions generally define rape as the act of
one who has sexual intercourse with another person by force and with-
out the victim's consent.7 Lack of consent is critical because this
requirement "protects women's choice and women's autonomy in sexual
relations."8 Some states avoid the use of "consent" in their statutes by
focusing on the actor's behavior. 9 These jurisdictions, however, shift
the focus back to the victim by permitting the defendant to assert the
victim's consent as an affirmative defense.1" Regardless of statutory
and victims are strangers, but in all rapes, only seventeen percent are strangers.); Susan Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1165 (1986) (In 1978, fifty-six percent of 930 women surveyed in the
San Francisco area said that they had been victims of forced intercourse or intercourse obtained by
threat; eighty-two percent of these rapes involved acquaintances.); Gibbs, supra note 1, at 48
("[W]hile 1 in 4 women will be raped in her lifetime, less than 10% will report the assault, and
less than 5% of the rapists will go to jail."); see also Scheppele, supra note 2, at 1096-98.
4. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, UNIFORM CRIME REP. FOR THE U.S. 1991, at 24. This
report defines rape as "carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will." The report
indicates that this definition includes assaults and attempted rape but excludes statutory rape. Id.
at 23.
5. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Crim. Just. Stat. 1990, at 279 (Lone-offender rapes
by well-known individuals accounted for 27.5%, and violations by casual acquaintances
accounted for 63.3%.).
6. Id. at 271.
7. For example, Louisiana's rape statute provides, in pertinent part: "Rape is the act of anal
or vaginal sexual intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person's lawful
consent." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.41 (West Supp. 1993); see also, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1406 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011
(1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05 - 130.20 (McKinney 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011
(West 1989 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). See generally Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay
on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1780, 1784 (1992) (noting that the two main elements of rape are nonconsent and force).
8. Estrich, supra note 3, at 1122.
9. For example, New Jersey's rape statute provides, in pertinent part:
An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with
another person under any one of the following circumstances:
(1). The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe
personal injury ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 12-13 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-d (West 1991). These statutes are
based on the Model Penal Code § 213 as adopted in 1962. Dripps, supra note 7, at 1784; see
generally Leigh Bienen, Rape 111 - National Developments In Rape Reform Legislation, 6
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170, 181 (1980) ('The purpose behind such definitions is to concentrate
on the behavior of the actor rather than that of the victim.").
10. See Dripps, supra note 7, at 1783-84 ("Even in reform jurisdictions, force remains an
element and consent remains a defense."); Pamela A. Wilk, Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape
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definitions, courts consider proof of the victim's lack of consent to be
central in all rape prosecutions.
When a defendant admits engaging in sexual intercourse with the
alleged victim, but argues that it was consensual, proof of nonconsent
becomes critical. To prove nonconsent, prosecutors may offer evidence
of the defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or acts under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) or its state equivalent.11 In many stranger rape cases,
such evidence is admissible under one of the enumerated exceptions to
the evidentiary rule excluding prior bad acts.12 For example, when the
defendant's identity is questioned, evidence of prior acts may be admis-
sible to show that the accused is, in fact, the perpetrator of the crime.' 3
In acquaintance rape cases, however, if the accused admits that sexual
intercourse occurred, identity is not at issue. In addition, the defendant's
admission of the intercourse eliminates the chief element of rape. 4
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the victim consented?
There is, however, another side to this issue. One may view the
question of whether the admitted sexual intercourse was consensual as
whether the defendant forced the victim to have intercourse with him.
Failure to recognize this side of the issue ignores the actus reus of the
crime-in other words, the accused's criminal behavior. When courts
Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 417, 422 (1984) ("Commentators have indicated.., that the jurisdictions with statutes most
heavily oriented toward defendant conduct still do not prohibit the defendant from raising the
common law defense of consent."); Wallace D. Loh, Q: What Has Reform of Rape Legislation
Wrought? A: Truth in Criminal Labelling, 37 J. Soc. ISSUES 28, 45-50 (1981) (arguing that the
changes in the laws are only semantic); see also Cynthia A. Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the
Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 399, 415 (1988) (noting that the woman's nonconsent is an implicit element of rape in the
Model Penal Code).
11. Rape is generally prosecuted in state court because it is a state crime. State courts,
however, apply their own evidentiary rules. For simplicity, this Comment discusses the
exclusionary rule of evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence because most
states have codified or use a rule similar to the federal rule. See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101(b)
(West 1966 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); LA.
CODE EvID. ANN. art. 404(B) (West Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2404 (West 1993).
For a complete comparison of the federal and state rules, see 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5231, at 334-39 (1978).
12. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oglen v. State, 440 So. 2d 1172,
1176 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (evidence of prior rape admissible to prove defendant's criminal
intent or motive or victim's nonconsent where the victim's consent was the only issue); State v.
Searles, 282 S.E.2d 430, 436 (N.C. 1981) (evidence of prior criminal acts admissible in rape case
to show defendant's motive and intent); cf. Robert N. Block, Comment, Defining Standards for
Determining the Admissibility of Evidence of Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L. REV. 261, 262
(1977) (noting the frequent "seeming violation of the exclusionary rule").
13. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 1948); Velez v. State, 762
P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v. Moore, 534 So. 2d 1275, 1279 (La. Ct. App.
1988).
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characterize the issue as whether the victim consented, rather than
whether the defendant applied force, they exclude the accused's prior
acts on the ground that one woman's consent, or lack thereof, is not
probative of another woman's choice.' 5 In acquaintance rape cases, the
defendant's prior acts may not be admitted to prove his propensity
toward the application of force.
Suppose a man is accused of acquaintance rape.6 He had taken a
fellow student at X University out to dinner. After dinner, the couple
went dancing at Club Z and then returned to his dorm room for a drink.
The couple kissed on the couch, and heavy petting ensued. When they
were fully undressed, he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her.
She said no; he did it anyway. At trial, the defendant admits that he
engaged in sexual intercourse with the alleged victim but argues that she
consented. The prosecution proffers alleged rape evidence of nine other
women: five students who attended the same university at the same time
as the defendant and four women who lived in the defendant's home
town. Each of these women knew the defendant prior to the alleged
rape, and each nonconsensual sexual experience occurred after the
woman and the defendant were alone together. These "dates" involved
different circumstances and occurred in different places, such as dancing
first and then going to a park or attending a party and then going to a
friend's dorm room.
According to the current legal framework, a court will not admit
evidence under the identity exception to Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) to prove that it was the defendant who committed the act,
because this issue is already established where the defendant admits to
engaging in consensual sex with the victim. The prosecution also cannot
proffer this evidence under the intent exception because if the defendant
in a rape trial admits the sexual act, the courts consider the intent to do
the act to be conclusively proved because rape is not a specific intent
crime. 7 Courts have also found that the defendant's prior acts are not
probative of what a different victim said or did in a different situation.' 8
Thus, courts that have framed the issue in terms of whether the victim
consented have refused to admit evidence of the defendant's prior bad
acts.
This framework does not comport with common sense. If a defend-
ant surpasses a woman's "no" and evidence demonstrates that he has not
15. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
16. This Comment focuses on male defendants and female victims because most prosecuted
cases include female victims and male defendants. This does not discount the role of consent in
prosecutions of rapes by males of other males or by females of males or other females.
17. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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responded to "no" in similar situations, the evidence is relevant. It is
more likely that the defendant intended to force the alleged victim to
have sexual intercourse with him if evidence demonstrates that the he
also forced nine other women to have sex with him. Moreover, a
defendant's conduct raises inferences about the victim's conduct. It is
more likely that a victim has been truthful about her lack of consent to
sexual intercourse if the defendant repeatedly has forced himself upon
other women.
The relevance of the prior acts, therefore, depends upon a court's
characterization of the issues. Courts must recognize that the criminal
behavior of the accused, the actus reus, is the remaining issue in an
acquaintance rape case.' 9 Courts may not recognize that the crime
depends on the defendant's act, partly because of an underlying differ-
ence between acquaintance rape cases and other criminal cases. In other
criminal cases, the prosecutor focuses on proving that the defendant
committed the crime, not that the crime occurred.2" In acquaintance
rape cases, however, the prosecutor has little difficulty proving the iden-
tity of the person who committed the act and that the sexual act
occurred. Rather, the prosecutor must focus on proving that the act that
occurred was criminal.
This Comment argues that the change in the rape statutes to focus
on the defendant's behavior is not enough. This change should prompt
an actual focus on the defendant's behavior during court proceedings. In
this light, prior crimes evidence may be proffered to prove the element
of force in the crime of rape.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)
A. Generally
At common law, courts did not admit evidence of a defendant's
character when introduced by the prosecution to imply that the defend-
ant acted in conformity with his character.2' The rationale behind this
rule was that character would only circumstantially prove the accused's
actions. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) incorporated this principle
19. See, e.g., Wicktom, supra note 10, at 404 (focus in rape should be on the offender's
conduct, not the victim's resistance).
20. See Dripps, supra note 7, at 1798 ("So long as a completed sex act is thought to constitute
the essence of the crime, attention will be misdirected to whether the woman's submission is
attributable to the defendant's force or to the woman's consent."); Wicktom, supra note 10, at 399
('This emphasis on the woman's consent, and the methods of proving it cause rape trials to differ
substantially from other criminal trials which focus on the conduct of the defendant.").
21. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDucr EVIDENCE § 2:18 (1984); Jennifer
Y. Schuster, Comment, The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI. L.
REv. 947, 947 (1988).
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with respect to evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts. 2 Rule 404(b)
provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....
The rule prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence of a
defendant's prior acts to characterize the defendant as a bad person with
a general criminal disposition or a person with a propensity to commit
the specific crime at issue.24 The rule, however, permits introduction of
prior crimes, wrongs, or acts when relevant for any purpose other than
propensity.2 5 For example, Rule 404(b) states that uncharged miscon-
duct evidence may be admitted to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent.26 Because the list in Rule 404(b) is prefaced by the words "such
as," it is not exclusive. 7
The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to avoid several evidentiary dangers.
First, the courts must avoid the prejudice to the defendant that occurs
when a jury draws the inference that the defendant is a bad person, an
"immoral law-breaker," or a criminal.2 8 Second, the jury may overesti-
22. Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Evidence as to Character;
Circumstantial Use, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 234, 234-35 (1983); Schuster, supra note 21, at 947.
23. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
24. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 404.5, at 198-200
(3d ed. 1991); Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of the
Defendant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm of the Flaws in the Uncharged Misconduct
Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. REV., 1, 3 (1985); Block, supra note 12, at 263; Amber Donner-Froelich,
Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove the Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Offense, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (1985).
25. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 209-20; Donner-Froelich, supra note 24, at 219.
There is dispute regarding this issue. Commentators and courts interpret the rule barring
propensity evidence in two different ways. First, the "exclusionary" approach, advocated by Dean
Wigmore, holds other crimes evidence inadmissible unless relevant to prove the specific
enumerated exceptions in Rule 404(b). JOHN H. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE 81 (3d ed. 1942).
Second, the "inclusionary" approach allows for the admissibility of all relevant evidence except
that which is relevant only to show a general disposition to commit the charged crime. Julius
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
Some courts, particularly the Second Circuit, consider Rule 404(b) a codification of the
inclusionary approach. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5239 at 435. Many courts,
however, still characterize the rule as one of exclusion. Id. As Professors Wright and Graham
have noted, "[hack of uniformity on this point is probably harmless; while the form of the rule
may affect the attitude with which the courts approach issues of other crimes evidence, it is
doubtful that it will determine the outcome of many cases." Id.
26. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
27. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 209-20; Schuster, supra note 21, at 948; see also
supra note 25.
28. Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 3; see also MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
[Vol. 48:343
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mate the probative value of the evidence, giving it more weight than it
deserves.2 9 Third, the evidence may confuse the jury by adding addi-
tional issues and wasting court time.3" Finally, the rule protects the
defendant from unexpectedly defending his or her prior actions.
31
The test for admitting prior crimes is similar in most state and fed-
eral courts.32 In Huddleston v. United States,33 the Supreme Court
found that, as a threshold inquiry, a court must determine whether simi-
lar acts evidence "is probative of a material issue other than character."34
The Court required that the evidence be relevant to a matter in issue.35
Moreover, the Court recognized that the incremental probative value of
the prior crimes evidence must outweigh the prejudice to the defendant
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.36 Finally, the Court held that the
proffered prior acts must be supported by a foundation of sufficient evi-
dence from which a jury could reasonably determine that the defendant
committed the prior acts.3 7
EVIDENCE § 185, at 439 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK]. In discussing the common law rule, Wigmore summarized two policy
considerations that are applicable to Rule 404(b) concerns: "The over-strong tendency to believe
the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts; [and] [t]he
tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the present charge, but because he has
escaped unpunished from other offenses." I JOHN H. WIOMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194, at 650 (3d ed. 1940).
29. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 24, at 3.
30. See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 185, at 439-40; Block, supra note
12, at 265.
31. See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 185, at 440; Block, supra note 12,
at 265; Schuster, supra note 21, at 959.
32. See supra note 11.
33. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
34. Id. at 686.
35. See id. at 689-91. The relevancy question is one of conditional relevancy; it depends on
the fulfillment of a condition of fact. Thus, the court determines whether the jury could
reasonably find the conditioned fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 689-90; see also
FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
36. Huddleston, 435 U.S. at 688, 691. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 403. The Court also noted that an instruction to the jury under Rule 105 to consider
the prior acts evidence only for the proper purpose protects the defendant from prejudice. Huddle-
ston, 485 U.S. at 691-92.
37. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-89; see also United States v. Penson, 896 F.2d 1087,
1091-92 (7th Cir. 1990) (restating Huddleston four-part test). Other federal decisions using a
similar test include: United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Cordell, 912 F.2d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez, 890 F.2d 1088, 1093-94
(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1059 (1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059,
1064 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084 (1990); United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528,
1535 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933 (1986); United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1142
1993]
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B. Stranger Rape Cases
In stranger rape cases, courts apply a variation of the Huddleston
test for admitting a defendant's prior sexual acts.38
1. MATERIAL ISSUE
In a rape prosecution where the defendant and victim were not
acquainted, the defendant's intent, motive, plan or scheme, or identity
may be at issue.39 The defendant's prior sexual acts may be relevant to
prove one of the enumerated exceptions to Rule 404(b). Some overlap
exits among these exceptions, but they are not mutually exclusive.40
Many courts relax the requirement that the exception be an issue in the
case in order to admit evidence in sex crimes cases.41 The enumerated
exceptions most relevant in rape cases are identity, intent, motive, and
plan or scheme. In addition, some courts have created exceptions for
lustful disposition, consent, and corroboration.
a. Identity
Identity is an ultimate issue in a stranger rape case. Frequently, the
prosecution offers motive, plan, knowledge or opportunity evidence to
raise an inference of identity. In order for evidence of prior crimes to
demonstrate identity, "[tihe pattern and characteristics of the crime must
be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. ' 42 A court, there-
fore, will not admit prior act evidence proffered to prove identity unless
the defendant committed the prior act in a sufficiently similar manner as
the current crime appears to have been committed.
In Bighames v. State,43 the defendant abducted a college woman
(4th Cir. 1986); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 912-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985).
In state courts the test is essentially the same. See, e.g., Spicer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 562, 563
(Ark. App. 1990); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990) (en bane); Holmes v. State,
511 N.E.2d 1060, 1061 (Ind. 1987); Cook v. State, 578 A.2d 283, 287-88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.),
cert. denied, 583 A.2d 276 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Ortiz, 142 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986); Lovely v. United States,
169 F.2d 386, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1948); Thomas v. State 599 So. 2d 158, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev.
denied, 604 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1992); State v. Goebel, 240 P.2d 251, 253 (Wash. 1952).
39. See 2 JOHN H. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 357, at 334
(Chadbourn rev. 1979 & Supp. 1992).
40. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 211.
41. Block, supra note 12, at 262.
42. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 559-560 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
McCormick refers to this type of evidence as proving a modus operandi; the jury can infer from
the evidence a method of the particular defendant that proves that the defendant committed the
crime charged. Id. at 559 n.17.
43. 440 So. 2d 1231 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
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from the University of Alabama and raped her." Two days before this
incident, the defendant abducted two other women from the same uni-
versity and raped them.4 5 Affirming the admission of prior crimes evi-
dence, the court found it "hard to imagine more identical offenses. 46
The court further stated that "[e]vidence that the accused has committed
other rapes in a novel or peculiar manner is clearly admissible to show
the identity of the now-charged [defendant]. 47
b. Intent
Intent, like identity, is an ultimate issue in a stranger rape case and
covers the mental elements of the crime. Intent is the state of mind that
negates "accident, inadvertence, or casualty. '48 Intent will theoretically
be in issue where the defendant asserts that the intent was of another
kind than to commit rape. 9 Courts have treated intent in rape cases
inconsistently because "if the act is proved, there can be no real question
as to intent."50 Many jurisdictions refuse to admit prior crimes on the
issue of intent and label the intent conclusively presumed., Other
courts find that when the sexual act is proven, intent is not in issue
because the defendant intended to have sexual intercourse if the act
occurred. 2 One court that has admitted prior acts evidence on the issue
of intent reasoned that "[blecause the victim's consent was the only
issue in [the] case, the evidence of the prior rape was admissible, under
an exception to the general exclusionary rule, to prove the defendant's
criminal intent or motive, or the nonconsent of the victim.
53
44. Id. at 1233.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. For a list of prior crimes evidence admitted by state courts for the purpose of identity,
see Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Admissibility, in Rape Case, of Evidence that Accused Raped
or Attempted to Rape Person Other Than Prosecutrix, 2 A.L.R. 4th 330, § 5[a] (1980).
48. M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 KAN. L. REv. 38, 48 (1957).
49. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 357, at 334.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 477 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (intent to do the
act conclusively presumed); see also Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1127 (1983) (intent is not in issue in action for sexual battery); State v. Cantrell, 673
P.2d 1147, 1154 (Kan. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984) (rape does not require specific
intent).
52. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 357, at 334; see, e.g., Alford v. State, 266 S.W.2d 804 (Ark.
1954) (reasoning that the jury must determine whether the acts described by the victim occurred,
foreclosing an analysis of the defendant's intent); State v. Moore, 534 So. 2d 1275 (La. Ct. App.
1988), cert. denied, 560 So. 2d 21 (La. 1990) (intent is not an issue in prosecution for rape);
People v. Bruce, 256 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), rev. granted, 823 P.2d 621 (Cal.
1992).
53. See, e.g., Oglen v. State, 440 So. 2d 1172, 1176 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 440 So.
2d 1177 (Ala. 1983); see also infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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c. Motive
Motive is "an emotion or state of mind that prompts a person to act
in a particular way . . . .",4 Motive is not an ultimate issue in a rape
case. Generally prosecutors proffer and courts admit prior acts evidence
under the motive exception to prove an ultimate issue in the case such as
intent or identity." The jury must, therefore, make an additional infer-
ence when considering evidence admitted under the motive exception.56
The jury first infers that the evidence proves the existence of a particular
motive and then infers that the motive proven translates to proof of
intent or identity-that a particular defendant committed a particular
crime or that because a defendant had a motive to commit a crime he
indeed intended to commit that crime.
d. Plan or Scheme
Plan or scheme "connotes a prior mental resolve to commit a crimi-
nal act, and implies preparation, and the working out of particulars-
time, place, manner, means and so forth. '57 A state's proffer of prior
crimes evidence to prove a defendant's plan does not raise an inference
about a defendant's character.5 8  Instead, a defendant's plan demon-
strates "a conscious commitment to a course of conduct of which the
charged crime is only a part. 59 Plan is not an ultimate issue in a rape
case. Such evidence, therefore, must be relevant to another issue in the
case such as identity or intent.6 °
In Williams v. State,6 1 for example, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the admissibility of prior crimes evidence to prove the defend-
ant's plan or scheme.62 Williams hid in the victim's car, stabbed her in
the chest with an ice pick, and raped her. 63 The trial court admitted
testimony that the defendant previously had hidden in the another
woman's car.64 After both incidents, the defendant told police that "he
thought [the car] belonged to his brother and crawled in the back to take
54. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5240, at 479.
55. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 202 nn.7-8.
56. Without motive evidence, a jury infers intent or identity directly from evidence of a
defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or acts.
57. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 206 n.12 (quoting 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 257 (1985)).
58. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5244, at 500.
59. Id.
60. For cases admitting prior crimes evidence under the plan or scheme exception, see
Travers, supra note 47, at 350-60.
61. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).
62. Id. at 663.
63. Id. at 656.






i. Lustful Disposition. Some courts create an exception outside
of the exclusionary rule to admit prior crimes evidence in rape cases.66
One such exception is called the "lustful disposition" exception.67 This
exception admits prior crimes evidence to demonstrate a defendant's
propensity for unusual or abnormal sexual behavior.6  Examples of the
lustful disposition exception exist in child sex abuse, incest, or sodomy
cases. 69 Courts and commentators have criticized the lustful disposition
exception because it takes sex crimes out of the purview of Rule
404(b).7 °
ii. Consent. Rule 404(b) does not expressly include an
exception for consent.71 Because nonconsent is critical in rape cases and
difficult to prove,72 prosecutors have attempted to proffer prior crimes
evidence to prove nonconsent. In Lovely v. United States,73 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals explained the general rule that when the sole
issue in the case is whether a victim consented to an admitted sexual act,
evidence of the accused's prior acts is not admissible.74 After analyzing
the intent, identity, and plan or scheme exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, the court stated that "[t]he fact that one woman was raped.., has
no tendency to prove that another woman did not consent.975 Most
65. Id.
66. See e.g., Austin v. State, 319 N.E.2d 130, 132 (Ind. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012
(1975) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to prior crimes "where the chief element of the
offense is illicit intercourse between the sexes ....").
67. GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5b, at 212 n.17; Slough, supra note 48, at 51. Courts also
refer to this exception as "depraved sexual instinct" or "lewd disposition." See Velez v. State, 762
P.2d 1297, 1301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (discussing cases that applied exception to sexual crimes
within immediate family or upon same victim); State v. Jerousek, 590 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Ariz.
1979) (sexual aberration); Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 1987) (depraved sexual
instinct); cf State v. Spaulding, 313 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1981) (unnatural sex crimes).
68. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 190, at 560.
69. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041, 1049 (Ind. 1992) (child sex); State v. Moore,
748 P.2d 833, 838 (Kan. 1988) (child sex); State v. Schut, 429 P.2d 126, 128 (Wash. 1967)
(incest); Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 977-78 (Wyo. 1989) (incest).
70. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 230 (2d ed. 1982); GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 404.5, at 212. The lustful disposition
exception does take the evidence out of the purview of Rule 404(b). This alternative, however,
has admitted prior acts evidence.
71. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
72. The essence of the issue of consent is the defendant's word against the victim's word
because there seldom are witnesses to the alleged rape.
73. 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 390.
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jurisdictions follow this rule.7 6
Some courts, however, have recognized the victim's inability to
prove consent without prior acts evidence. These courts, sympathizing
with the outrageousness of rape cases, volley back and forth between
admitting and excluding prior crimes evidence on the issue of consent.77
Courts frequently use the intent exception to admit the evidence on the
issue of consent. These courts reason that when a defendant admits that
sexual intercourse occurred but claims the victim consented, the
defendant specifically places in issue his intent to have criminal sexual
intercourse.78 This reasoning is controversial because rape is not a
specific intent crime, and thus the prosecution need not separately prove
intent.
Under the current framework, a prosecutor must fit the evidence
into an enumerated exception in order for a court to admit this
evidence.79 Finding another exception, such as identity, is not a difficult
task in stranger rape cases.
iii. Corroboration. As with consent, some courts admit prior
acts evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony when the prior act is
76. See, e.g., People v. Bruce, 256 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1989), rev. granted, 823 P.2d 621
(Cal. 1992) ("The evidence of the prior rape was therefore irrelevant to the ultimate fact of
consent or lack of it."); Ross v. State, 516 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. 1987); Meeks v. State, 234 N.E.2d 629,
632 (Ind. 1968) (other alleged rape irrelevant when consent is only issue); State v. Hatcher, 372
So. 2d 1024 (La. 1979) (lack of consent by other victims is not probative of lack of consent of
present victim); State v. Bullock, 651 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Pace, 275
S.E.2d 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Beaulieu, 359 A.2d 689 (R.I. 1976); Caldwell v. State,
477 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Foster v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 745 (Va. Ct. App.
1987); State v. Irving, 601 P.2d 954 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), rev. denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1007
(1980).
77. See, e.g., People v. Key, 203 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing rape cases
where courts admitted prior crimes evidence, but ultimately excluding this evidence). In a recent
case, the California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, declined to follow People v. Key and other
precedent on the issue of consent and found that there is a question of criminal intent when the
defendant admits that consensual sexual intercourse occurred. People v. Balcom, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
879, 885-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1991), rev. granted, 823 P.2d 621 (Cal. 1992).
78. See O'Neal v. State, 318 S.E.2d 66, 67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) ('Thus, evidence of the earlier
rape was material on the issue of consent or lack thereof, and had a direct bearing on appellant's
bent of mind."); see also Davis v. State, 635 P.2d 481, 485 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). But see Velez
v. State, 762 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (disapproving of this reasoning).
79. See, e.g., Oglen v. State, 440 So. 2d 1172, 1176 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 440 So.
2d 1177 (Ala. 1983) (noting that when consent is the only issue, prior crimes evidence is
admissible to show the accused's "criminal intent or motive, or nonconsent of the victim"). But
see Jones v. State, 580 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 1991 Ala. LEXIS 1240 (May 24,
1991) (calling into question Oglen and other cases that admit uncharged misconduct evidence on
the issue of consent under the intent exception and admitting the evidence under the plan or
scheme exception, which requires an inference to intent or identity); Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d
350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (affirming admission of evidence establishing common scheme or plan
when only issue in case was consent).
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also relevant to show another enumerated exception.8 ° The evidence,
however, must be crucial to the prosecution's case. Corroboration must
be direct and the matter corroborated must be significant."1 Courts
apply this standard strictly because the corroboration theory may justify
the admission of evidence of questionable relevance. 2 In stranger rape
cases, the prosecution can usually ground its proffer of evidence in an
enumerated exception to Rule 404(b), such as identity or intent.8 3 The
need for a corroboration exception is thus greatly reduced when the
defendant and victim are strangers.
2. SIMILARITY REQUIREMENT
Most of the exclusionary rule exceptions require a threshold level
of similarity to the charged offense for admissibility, because prior acts
must be logically relevant to some issue in the case. 4 This threshold
level varies depending upon which exception to the exclusionary rule a
court uses to admit the evidence. For example, in cases that admit prior
acts evidence under the identity exception, there must be a high degree
of similarity, akin to a signature.8 5 Identity "requires an inference to the
conduct of the defendant; therefore, great care must be taken to insure
that the theory of admissibility does not involve any inference as to the
defendant's character.
8 6
Categories to which courts have looked in rape cases to find simi-
larity include:
80. See Crook v. Henderson, 310 F. Supp. 200, 202 (E.D. La. 1970) (admitting similar fact
evidence under Louisiana law to show intent, corroboration, and licentious disposition of
defendant); People v. Pendleton, 599 P.2d 649, 653 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (intent and
corroboration); State v. Stegmann, 213 S.E.2d 262, 273 (N.C. 1975), vacated in part, 428 U.S.
902 (1976) (identity and corroboration).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1069 (1988) (evidentiary issue arose in context of armed robbery).
82. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5177, at 145.
83. Id. § 5248, at 522. Professors Wright and Graham state that evidence may be admitted in
some situations to corroborate without the impermissible inference but caution that "[i]f the
evidence would not be independently admissible to prove the commission of the crime, it is
difficult to see why it becomes admissible because the prosecution has a witness who will testify
to the act." Id. § 5248 at 521-22.
84. See FED. R. EvID. 401. The plan or preparation exception does not require similarity
because it divulges the defendant's steps leading up to the alleged crime. See supra notes 57-65
and accompanying text.
One commentator argued that "[t]he test should be logical relevance rather than similarity."
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 2:12, at 35-36. "[Tihe prevailing view in the United States is that
even dissimilar acts can be logically relevant and admissible on an uncharged misconduct theory."
Id. (citation omitted).
85. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 2:12, at 35-36; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11,
§ 5246, at 513.
86. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5246, at 512-13.
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the time of day in which the offenses occurred, the geographical
proximity of the various offenses, the ages of the victims, the type of
clothing worn by the assailant, the language used by the assailant, the
type of building or area in which the assaults took place, the method
of entry and exit from the victim's residence, the type of vehicle
driven by the assailant, whether other types of sexual assaults were
committed on the victims, whether the assailant had a weapon, and if
so, the type of weapon, whether bodily harm was used or threatened,
the manner in which the accused became familiar with the victims,
and the manner in which the victim was initially accosted.87
3. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
Courts must apply the probative value test of Rule 403 to admit
evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct.8 8 "Rule 403 permits
the judge to exclude logically relevant evidence when the accompanying
[prejudicial] dangers outweigh the probative value of the evidence. '89
Danger of unfair prejudice is great with evidence of prior rapes.9"
Therefore, the incremental probative value of the evidence must be sig-
nificant in order to admit prior acts evidence. Courts consider
the strength of the evidence as to commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alterna-
tive proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse
the jury to overmastering hostility.9 '
It is important to note that the level of similarity between the prior acts
and the charged crime increases proportionately to both the probative
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence.92 In addition, when balanc-
ing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect to
the defendant, courts take into account protections of a limiting instruc-
tion under Federal Rule of Evidence 105 and instruct the jury to consider
the evidence only for its relevant purpose.93
87. Travers, supra note 47, at 341-42 (citations omitted).
88. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688, 691 (1988).
89. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to
Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 592 (1990).
90. See State v. Collins, 698 P.2d 969, 973 (1985); see also Ronald N. Boyce, Evidence of
Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 UTAH B.J. 31, 41 (1977).
91. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 190, at 565.
92. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 8:07, at 15 ("The high degree of similarity increases
the probative value of the evidence.") (citation omitted).
93. Courts consider these instructions effective. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
691-92 (1988). The limiting instruction, however, is of "little practical significance since logic
and experience indicate that the jury will be incapable of considering the evidence solely for the
purpose offered and not as evidence of the guilt of the defendant for the crime charged." GRAHAM,
supra note 24, § 404.5, at 233 n.38 (citation omitted). For an extreme view, see Abraham P.
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III. ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CASES
A. Generally
Although prosecuted under similar statutes as stranger rape but
with lesser punishments, acquaintance rape is different from stranger
rape.94 "[T]he tell tale characteristics of 'stranger rape', frequently
accompanied by savage and gratuitous violence, would [not] necessarily
be present in cases of 'acquaintance-rape' or 'date rape'." 95 Moreover,
police officers, prosecutors, juries and judges are more sympathetic to
stranger rape than acquaintance rape. 96 "[B]ecause [acquiantance rape]
does not involve physical injury, and because physical injury is often the
only criterion that is accepted as evidence that the actus reas is noncon-
sensual, what is really sexual assault is often mistaken for seduction."97
Therefore, juries fail to convict in acquaintance rape cases. 98
Courts perhaps are becoming more aware of the severity of the
acquaintance rape problem. In Deborah S. v. Diorio,99 the court defined
date or acquaintance rape "as a form of male assault rather than female
error."' ° The court further stated that acquaintance rape "causes incal-
culable injury to society as well as private interests."' 0' Considered in
this light, police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges cannot continue
to disregard the crime of acquaintance rape. The legal community's new
emphasis on this problem should continue.
Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a),
38 EMORY L.J. 135, 175 (1989) ("The empirical research demonstrates that jurors are deeply
affected by prejudicial comments and evidence and that curative instructions tend to increase the
prejudice rather than decrease it.").
94. See, for example, the Model Penal Code, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of
rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious
bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; ....
Rape is a felony in the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor
inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary
social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not
previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of
the first degree.
Model Penal Code § 213.1 (Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added). Acquaintance rape "is distin-
guished from: incest, authority rape (doctors & teachers), spousal rapes and [rapes of] children
under 14." Deborah S. v. Diorio, 583 N.Y.S.2d 872, 877 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992) (citation omitted).
95. Rhodes v. State, 539 A.2d 1160, 1160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
96. Scheppele, supra note 2, at 1100.
97. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 217 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 2, at 1100.
99. 583 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992).
100. Id. at 877.
101. Id. at 878.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Prior uncharged misconduct evidence is generally inadmissible in
acquaintance rape cases.' 0 2 Several reasons exist for this unrecognized,
or perhaps recognized but unarticulated, rule. First, the victim and the
accused knew each other before the alleged rape; therefore, the defend-
ant's identity in an acquaintance rape trial is not a material issue. More-
over, in acquaintance rape cases, as in stranger rape cases, intent is
generally not in issue unless the defendant maintains that the sexual act
never occurred.' 03 Because these two ultimate facts, intent and identity,
are usually not in issue, other exceptions to Rule 404(b) such as motive,
plan, knowledge, or opportunity are also inapplicable in rape cases.,
0 4
Moreover, when the defendant concedes that the sexual act occurred but
claims the victim consented, courts perceive the victim's lack of consent
as the only issue in the case.
1. MATERIAL ISSUE
The case law in acquaintance rape cases parallels the case law in
stranger rape cases in which consent is the only controverted issue.
10 5
The law is both confused and erratic.' ° The courts excluding evidence
of a defendant's prior acts do so because when consent is the only issue,
prior crimes evidence has no probative value relative to the victim's
consent. "The fact that one woman was raped ... has no tendency to
prove that another woman did not consent."
0 7
On the other hand, some courts pigeonhole prior crimes evidence
102. See, e.g., Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (inadmissible propensity
evidence); Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d
1339 (Ind. 1982); State v. Saltarelli, 655 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982) (en banc); State v. Cox, 787 P.2d
4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
103. Thornton v. State, 376 N.E.2d 492, 494 (Ind. 1978) (Prior crimes evidence was logically
relevant to establish that the charged and disputed act of sexual intercourse had occurred.).
104. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, §§ 5240, 5244-45. But see, e.g., Jones v. State,
580 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 1991 Ala. LEXIS 1240 (May 24, 1991) (Defendant
admitted consensual sexual intercourse with victim. Court admitted uncharged misconduct
evidence under the "plan or scheme" exception even though it stated that intent was not in issue.).
105. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Jones, 580 So. 2d at 97. (discussing the confused state of Alabama law,
ultimately casting doubt on four cases that admitted prior crimes evidence on the issue of intent as
revived by a defense of consent, and admitting the prior crimes evidence under the plan or scheme
exception).
107. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948); see also Velez v. State, 762
P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375, 1378-79 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981); Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. 1984); Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339,
1346-47 (Ind. 1982); State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5-6 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Saltarelli, 655
P.2d 697, 699-701 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) ("The evidence should not be admitted to show intent
... if intent is of no consequence to the outcome of the action.").
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into an exception to Rule 404(b) in an effort to admit that evidence. 0
For example, in Jones v. State,"° an Alabama court held that evidence
of prior crimes was not admissible on the issue of intent or consent but
found that the evidence was admissible to show a common plan or
scheme.' Identity, however, was not in issue. Because plan or scheme
requires a second inference to an issue in the case, such as identity or
intent, this court effectively re-reasoned the precedent using circular
logic and admitted the evidence under the intent exception.'1
Other courts construe the defendant's admission that consensual
sex occurred as placing in issue the defendant's intent. For example, in
State v. Moore,"2 a Louisiana appellate court defined the issue as
"intent to perform the act without the victim's consent.""''
2. SIMILARITY REQUIREMENT
Traditional notions of similarity do not work in acquaintance rape
cases because of an underlying difference between stranger rape and
acquaintance rape.' 4 This difference stems from the behavior of both
the victim and the accused during an acquaintance rape. "[T]he 'date
rape' victim does not generally fear for her life and run screaming from
the scene.""' 5 The alleged rapist does not hide in the bushes and attack
the victim in the street or hold a gun to the victim's head. Thus, the
nonconsensual sexual act of each defendant occurs in different times,
places, and manners. Therefore, the criteria for the similarity test do not
afford acquaintance rape victims the opportunity to present prior crimes
evidence. 
1 16
108. See, e.g., State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. 1984) (Prior crimes evidence is
highly relevant to consent because it shows "a pattern of similar aggressive sexual behavior by
defendant against other women in the community.").
109. 580 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 1991 Ala. LEXIS 1240 (May 24, 1991).
110. Id. at 99-101. This case is representative of the confusion in the prior crimes rape case
law. The Jones court discussed the major cases in Alabama on consent but reached an opposite
conclusion.
111. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5244, at 500. But see Oliphant v. Koehler,
451 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (Mich. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1979) (treating proof of plan
or scheme as an ultimate issue in the case).
112. 534 So. 2d 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
113. Id. at 1279. This court originally decided, before rehearing, that admission of other
crimes evidence constituted reversible error when consent was the only issue. Id. at 1278-79; see
also Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 248 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
114. See, e.g., Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. 1986) (traditional notions of similarity
require similar fact evidence to be similar in every respect).
115. Rhodes v. State, 539 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
116. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. For example, if a man takes a woman to a
bar, brings her to his home in Virginia and subsequently rapes her at night, this behavior is not
sufficiently similar to an incident involving the same man who meets a woman at a party, takes
1993]
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3. STATE V. SMITH
The confusing treatment of prior crimes evidence in acquaintance
rape cases is illustrated by the Florida case of State v. Smith." 7 The
State of Florida charged William Kennedy Smith with sexual battery.'
1 8
The prosecution alleged that the defendant met the victim, Patricia Bow-
man, at a bar. 119 After they spent time together, Mr. Smith asked Ms.
Bowman for a ride to the Kennedy Estate in Palm Beach, Florida.120
She drove him to the house and accepted his invitation to go inside. 21
Later, they walked along the beach.' 22 While on the beach, Mr. Smith
undressed and asked Ms. Bowman if she wanted to swim. 23 She
declined and turned to walk toward the house. The prosecution alleged
that Ms. Bowman,
[h]aving reached the top of the stairs.... was suddenly tripped by the
defendant grabbing her ankle. Breaking free she ran but a short dis-
tance before the defendant tackled her on the lawn. Holding her
hands above her head with his hand the defendant pinned her to the
ground with his weight and violently raped Patricia .... [When the
victim confronted the defendant, he] denied the rape and told her that
no one would believe her.
124
Mr. Smith admitted that he had consensual sexual intercourse with the
Ms. Bowman. The only perceived issue in the case was whether Ms.
Bowman consented.
The prosecution proffered prior acts evidence of three earlier
events: (1) In 1983, Lisa Lattes attended a party in New York where
she met Mr. Smith, her boyfriend's cousin. 2  At the party, Mr. Smith
her to a hotel room in California and subsequently rapes her in the afternoon. See, e.g., Edmond
v. State, 521 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
117. No. 91-5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991).
118. The Florida sexual battery statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Definitions:
(a) The term "consent" means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and shall
not be construed to include coerced submission....
(5) A person who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older,
without that person's consent, and in the process thereof uses physical force and
violence not likely to cause serious personal injury is guilty of a felony of the
second degree ....
FLA. STAT. ch. 794.011 (1991).
119. Prosecution's Memorandum of Law on William's Rule Evidence at 6-7, State v. Smith,
No. 91-5482-CF-AO2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Prosecution's Memorandum].





125. Motion to Exclude William's Rule Evidence at 18, State v. Smith, No. 91-5482-CF-A02
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Motion to Exclude].
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invited her to stay in the guest room of his house. Once there, "he
grabbed her by her shoulders, pushed her onto the bed, covered her body
with his, and tried kissing her."' 26 He also touched her underwear. She
struggled and Mr. Smith stood up and apologized.1 27 A few minutes
later, he attacked her again. She struggled in response, he allowed her to
get up, apologized and tried to convince her to stay.' 28 When Ms. Lattes
tried to leave, he grabbed her again telling her that he only made a pass
at her.'2 9 Subsequently, she left.'
31
(2) In 1988, Lynn Gulledge, a medical student, attended a party in
Washington, D.C.'31 Mr. Smith, a fellow medical student, also attended
this party and invited Ms. Gulledge and others to his apartment to
swim.13 2 The two walked to the pool, but no one else arrived. 33 Mr.
Smith took off his clothes and went swimming; Ms. Gulledge, however,
declined to undress and swim.' 34 The couple then returned to Mr.
Smith's apartment where they talked for a few minutes.'35 Mr. Smith
grabbed Ms. Gulledge's wrists, pushed her to the floor, and kissed
her.136 She struggled while Mr. Smith held her down. She then told him
she wanted to go home.1 37 Mr. Smith asked Ms. Gulledge to come
upstairs. After she went up a couple of stairs, Mr. Smith escorted her to
the door, unlocked it and let her leave. 138 Shaking and crying, Ms. Gul-
ledge walked to her car and left.
139
(3) In 1988, Michelle Meyer, a medical student, attended a picnic in
Washington D.C. 140 Mr. Smith also attended. 4' Ms. Meyer and Mr.
Smith both went to a local bar after the picnic.' 42 Ms. Meyer became
intoxicated and Mr. Smith, who was also drunk, offered her a ride
126. Id.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 75, 77.
130. Id. at 80.





136. Id. at 23-24.
137. Id. at 24.
138. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 5.
139. Id. The Motion to Exclude, however, does not state that Ms. Gulledge went upstairs or
that she left crying. See Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 24.
140. Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 20; Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at
6.
141. Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 20-21; Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note
119, at 6.
142. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 6.
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home. 14 3 He took her to his apartment rather than to her own.'" Mr.
Smith insisted she sleep upstairs in his loft.' 45 Once there, he began
kissing her.'4 6 She told him to stop; but Mr. Smith undressed and got
into bed with her.147 Though she again told him to stop, he removed her
clothes, put on a condom, and had sex with her.1 48 She then passed out
and left in the morning after breakfast.'
49
The prosecution proffered these prior acts as evidence under the
following exceptions to the exclusionary rule: (1) plan, scheme, or
modus operandi; (2) lack of consent; (3) corroboration; and/or (4) oppor-
tunity.' 50 The defense argued that none of these exceptions represented
a material fact in issue and none of the incidents was relevant to the
victim's consent.'
51
For the similarity prong of the Huddleston test, the prosecution
argued that (1) all four victims met the defendant at social gatherings;'
52
(2) all of the victims noticed a sudden change in the defendant's person-
ality; 1 3 (3) three of the victims were attacked and pushed onto a bed or
the ground; 154 (4) the defendant had a drink or had been drinking in all
four cases; 55 (5) the defendant enticed all of the victims to his home at
the time under false pretenses; 56 and (6) the defendant told three of the
victims that nothing happened.' 57  The defense argued that the tradi-
tional requirements of similarity such as location, time of day, sexual
penetration, or injury were not present in the case. "In short, the pur-
143. Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 21.
144. Id.
145. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 6.
146. Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 21.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 21-22.
150. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 10-32.
151. Defendant's Reply to State's Memorandum of Law on William's Rule Evidence at 3-12,
State v. Smith, No. 91-5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Defendant's
Reply]. The test in Florida is similar to that of other jurisdictions. The party offering the prior
crimes evidence, known as William's rule evidence, must show that the evidence is relevant to
prove a material fact in issue and that these matters are similar to the charged offense, sharing
"some unique characteristics or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other
offenses." Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987). The Heuring court noted that in
cases of sexual battery within the familial context, courts relax the similarity requirement. Id; see
also Calloway v. State, 520 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1988)
(relaxing the rigidity of the similarity requirement where identity is not an issue).
152. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 8.
153. Id.
154. Id. (Ms. Bowman, Ms. Gulledge, and Ms. Lattes).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Prosecution's Memorandum, supra note 119, at 3, 5, 9 (Ms. Bowman, Ms. Gulledge, and
Ms. Lattes).
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ported similarities that the State points to are factors that are fairly
descriptive of any 'acquaintance' rape and are insufficient to meet the
'strikingly similar' requirement."'' 58
The court refused to admit the evidence. 59 Mr. Smith's prior acts,
especially those with Ms. Meyer, were arguably relevant to show
whether he intended to force the Ms. Bowman to have nonconsensual
sexual intercourse with him and to corroborate Ms. Bowman's testi-
mony. The following theoretical framework details how those acts are
relevant and why the court should have admitted at least Mr. Smith's
prior act with Ms. Meyer consistent with Florida's enactment of the
prior acts rule.'
60
IV. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
The plain language of Rule 404(b) bars evidence of prior crimes,
wrongs, or acts when the prosecution proffers the evidence to prove the
defendant's propensity to commit the act charged. In acquaintance rape
cases, the state may not use the defendant's prior sexual conduct to
imply that because the defendant previously had nonconsensual inter-
course with four other women, he is a rapist and thus committed the
charged rape.'61 The defendant's prior sexual behavior is admissible,
however, to prove any other relevant fact in issue, subject to the limita-
tions of Rule 403.162
A. Material Issue
1. ACTUS REUS
When a defendant admits that he had sexual intercourse with a vic-
tim, courts shift the emphasis from the defendant and concentrate on the
victim's behavior and mental state. "[T]he cases prematurely conclude
that the defendant, by claiming consent, has admitted both the actus reus
158. Defendant's Reply, supra note 151, at 11. The defense also argued, albeit incorrectly,
that the strikingly similar standard followed by Florida courts in cases admitting prior acts under
the identity exception also applies for other exceptions. Motion to Exclude, supra note 125, at 15.
159. State v. Smith, No. 91-5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. December 11, 1991). There is no
opinion on this ruling; the court's ruling is, however, stated in the trial transcripts.
160. Florida Rule 90.404(2)(a) is essentially the same as Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b). It
provides:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to
prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is
inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or
propensity.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1992).
161. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
162. See id.
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and the culpable mental state for the offense."163 This conclusion stems
from an incorrect definition of the criminal act and forces courts to focus
on the victim's mental state rather than the defendant's conduct. Courts
cannot treat the defendant's claim of consensual sexual intercourse as an
admission of the completed act, because rape is defined as forced non-
consensual sexual intercourse.1 64  Similarly, the prosecution cannot
prove the actus reus by merely proving that sexual intercourse occurred.
Thus, courts must recognize all of the relevant issues when a defendant
admits that sexual intercourse occurred:
(1) the mental state and conduct of the victim (recognized as the only
issue by the courts);
(2) the defendant's awareness of the victim's conduct and state of
mind; and
(3) the defendant's subjective and physical response to that aware-
ness-whether forced nonconsensual intercourse occurred.
The third issue clearly includes the defendant's mental and physical
response to the victim's actions.
In the typical scenario, the prosecutor offers evidence of prior acts
of forced sexual intercourse to prove that the defendant intended to force
the victim to have sexual intercourse, regardless of her lack of consent.
This evidence calls for a pattern of inferences that does not violate Rule
404(b). The intent to use force, as demonstrated by the defendant's prior
acts, proves that the act of forced sexual intercourse occurred, at least as
a reasonable inference based on probability. The distinction between the
illegal inference and the legal one is the change in the jury's inference
pattern. The jury should infer from a defendant's prior rapes that he
intended to force the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. From
this intent, the jury infers that it is unlikely that the current alleged rape
did not occur. The unlikelihood of the non-occurrence stems from the
principle that with each act of forced intercourse it is more likely that the
defendant intended to surpass the victim's "no." Thus, the ultimate
inference that the jury has made was the objective unlikelihood of mis-
163. Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297, 1312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Bryner, C.J., dissenting). A
crime includes actus reus, the criminal act, and mens rea, the culpable mental state. The actor
must have both the physical conduct and the mental state to violate a particular statute. WAYNE
LAFAVE & AUSTIN ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3:1, at 194 (2d ed. 1986). Rape is sexual intercourse
in which the actor compels the victim to submit by force or by threat. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1(1)(a) (Official Draft 1962). Rape is also defined as sexual intercourse without the
victim's consent, where the actor uses physical force and violence. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011(5) (1991). Therefore, the actus reus of rape is forced sexual intercourse or forced
nonconsensual sexual intercourse.
164. See, e.g., People v. Balcom, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted,
823 P.2d 621 (1992) (quoting People v. Burnham, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1986) (alterations in
original)) ("[T]he 'wrongful intent' is the intent to sexually penetrate the victim and the intent to
accomplish that act by force or fear.").
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take. Under this framework, the probative value of the evidence
increases proportionately to the number of incidents, because the
probability that the act was criminal increases.
This theory is called the doctrine of chances. Wigmore character-
ized the doctrine as "the instinctive recognition of that logical process
which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances
of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain
them all." '65 Another commentator explained:
The courts reason that as the number of incidents increases, the
objective probability of accident decreases. . . . The coincidence
defies common sense and is too peculiar. . . . [T]he intermediate
inference is objective unlikelihood under the doctrine of chances
rather than the defendant's subjective character.
166
One example of the doctrine of chances is the wife found dead in
the bathtub of her home. 167 The state charges defendant, her husband,
with murder, and he claims that his wife drowned accidentally. 6 Evi-
dence of similar deaths of the defendant's other wives is admissible to
show that the charged offense occurred, as it is improbable that all the
deaths were accidental. 
169
Suppose the defendant from the introductory hypothetical,'
charged with rape, claims the sexual act was consensual. If nine women
offer testimony that he forced them to have sexual intercourse with him
without their consent, the doctrine of chances holds that it is unlikely
165. WMoRE, supra note 39, § 302, at 241.
166. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 4:01.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. See also WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 302, at 241-45. Wigmore provides another
example:
[I]f A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun whistling past his head, he
is willing to accept B's bad aim .. .as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly
afterwards the same thing happens again, and if on the third occasion A receives B's
bullet in his body, the immediate inference ... is that B shot at A deliberately;
because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive similar
occasions are extremely small; or ... because inadvertence or accident is only an
abnormal or occasional explanation for the discharge of a gun at a given object, and
therefore the recurrence of a similar result ... excludes the fair possibility of such
an abnormal cause and points out the cause as probably a more natural and usual
one, i.e., a deliberate discharge at A. In short, similar results do not usually occur
through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar result . . . tends . . . to
negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent
mental state, and tends to establish ...the presence of the normal, i.e. criminal,
intent accompanying such an act; and the force of each additional instance will vary
in each kind of offense according to the probability that the act could be repeated,
within a limited time and under given circumstances, with an innocent intent.
id. at 241.
170. See text accompanying note 16.
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that all the incidents of sexual intercourse, including the charged crime,
were consensual. Simply stated, the defendant's prior misconduct is
offered to prove that he intended to force her into sexual intercourse.
Critics of the actus reus theory of admissibility "argue that this use
of uncharged misconduct is the very theory of logical relevance forbid-
den by the first sentence of the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
prosecutor is offering uncharged misconduct 'to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.' "171 On
the other hand, commentators note that the forbidden logical relevance
to the defendant's action consistent with his character does not exist.
1 72
2. CORROBORATION
A second theory of admissibility of prior acts evidence rests on
corroboration of the victim's testimony. This theory addresses the issue
of whether the victim actually said "no." Questions of credibility inhere
in acquaintance rape cases.1 7 3 The incident occurs in the presence of
only two people: the victim and the defendant. The case hinges on
whether the jury believes the victim's or the defendant's testimony.
This renders corroboration of the victim's testimony crucial to the prose-
cution's case.'17  Corroborative evidence both reduces the possibility
that the victim is lying and increases the probability that the defendant
committed the crime.' 75 One commentator discovered that a standard to
admit circumstantial corroborative testimony already exists in some
jurisdictions.'
76
Under this standard, the defendant's prior conduct says something
about the victim's present conduct-that she is not lying.' 77 If the nine
witnesses testify that the defendant ignored their "nos," the normal infer-
ence that a man would respect a woman's refusal is contradicted. Thus,
171. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 4:01, at 2 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 404(b)); see also
William Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297, 312 (1982); Note, Admissibility of Evidence of Similar Offenses in
Criminal Prosecutions in West Virginia, 54 W. VA. L. REv. 142, 148-49 (1951).
172. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 21, § 4:01, at 3-5.
173. Glanville Williams, Corroboration-Sexual Cases, 1962 CRIM. L. REV. 662, 662 (false
sexual charges are common); Block, supra note 12, at 285 n. 113 (noting controversy over need for
corroboration in rape cases).
174. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
175. Williams, supra note 173, at 666 ("There is always a possibility that a witness is lying,
and the possibility is rather pronounced in sexual cases. But the possibility becomes greatly
reduced if there are two witnesses .... ); Block, supra note 12, at 286.
176. See Block, supra note 12, at 285-290; see also, State v. Thornton, 376 N.E.2d 492, 494
(Ind. 1978) (admitting evidence to prove that act occurred and corroborate victim's testimony);
State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1988) (finding that prior sexual conduct makes it
more probable that the victim was telling the truth).
177. Block, supra note 12, at 288.
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it is more likely that this victim did not concoct her story. This infer-
ence does not imply that simply because one woman refused, this
woman also refused. It is his prior conduct that makes it more likely
that she did not consent to sexual intercourse.
3. SIMILARITY REQUIREMENT
In acquaintance rape cases there should be some similarity between
occurrences because, as the actus reus doctrine of chances theory sug-
gests, it is improbable that the same chance circumstance would occur
repeatedly.' 78 Because of the acute differences between acquaintance
rape and stranger rape, courts must redefine similarity in the acquain-
tance rape context. 179 Public awareness of acquaintance rape and social
science literature on the problem have recently caused courts to recog-
nize the differences between these two types of rape. 8 ' The real hall-
mark of similarity between prior sexual acts and the rape at issue is not
where it occurred and at what time. The inquiry must be more focused:
(1) what happened after the accused and the victims were alone;
(2) what happened after the victims allegedly said no; and
(3) whether the victim and the defendant had sexual intercourse.
Consider again the rape hypothetical in the introduction as com-
pared with one of the hypothetical defendant's prior rapes: In 1990, the
man took a woman he met in a graduate math class at X University out
to dinner. At 11:00 p.m., they went dancing at Club Z. At 1:00 a.m., he
took her to his dorm room at the university and kissed her passionately.
He attempted to undress her; she told him "no." Nevertheless, he suc-
ceeded in undressing her and heavy petting ensued. He attempted to
have intercourse with her; she again told him "no." He pinned her arms
down and told her she wanted him. After the sexual act was completed
she said, "You should not have done that." He replied, "You wanted it."
She left his dorm in the morning.
Now compare this with a prior event: In the summer of 1989, the
defendant worked as a mathematician in Pennsylvania. His friend intro-
duced him to a woman, a math teacher from a local high school. The
defendant took the woman to an afternoon movie at 2:00 p.m. After the
movie, they went back to her apartment for a drink and decided to play
strip poker. The woman lost and was wearing only her undergarments
by 5:00 p.m. Then the defendant, who was fully dressed, undressed and
pushed the woman onto the floor in the living room. Next, he attempted
to have sex with her. She pushed him off of her, stood up, and began to
178. WIoMORE, supra note 39, § 302, at 245.
179. See supra notes 94-101, 114-16 and accompanying text.
180. E.g., Rhodes v. State, 539 A.2d 1160, 1160-61 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
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dress. He pushed her back down, took off her underwear, and had inter-
course with her. Afterward, he got dressed and left her apartment.
The times at which these events occurred and their locations are
irrelevant. What the victims and the defendant were wearing, where
they went, and how they got there are also irrelevant. These cases are
sufficiently similar, however, to meet the proposed test because:
(1) the defendant attacked the women after they were alone for some
time;
(2) he continued the sexual act after the victim said or intimated
"no;" and
(3) he completed the sexual act.
The Smith case provides a second example."'1 Mr. Smith's prior
sexual conduct with Ms. Meyer is. sufficiently similar to the charged
crime. In both instances, the defendant allegedly forced the victims into
sexual intercourse after he was alone with them and they had said or
intimated "no." The prior sexual intercourse with Ms. Meyer was rele-
vant to prove that Mr. Smith forced Ms. Bowman to have sexual inter-
course with him. When combined with other acts, the probability that
these similarities are not merely coincidental increases the probative
value of this evidence.
1 82
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Trial courts must balance the probative value of the uncharged mis-
conduct evidence against the prejudice to the defendant. 183 This is a
discretionary standard that excludes highly prejudicial evidence to
ensure a fair trial. When consent is the only issue, the prior acts evi-
dence is highly probative of the defendant's act and the victim's testi-
mony. Few other methods of proof exist. The entire case hinges on the
defendant's word against that of the victim. A limiting instruction
would direct the jury to consider the evidence only for its proper pur-
pose.' 84 On the other hand, prior acts evidence may also be highly prej-
udicial to the defendant. The jury may consider the defendant a rapist.
In addition, the prosecution would expend a significant amount of time
presenting evidence from nine witnesses that the defendant had raped
them. Moreover, the jury may attempt to penalize the defendant for his
prior acts in addition to the present crime. Weighing these issues against
the probative value of the evidence is a difficult task. The scales, how-
181. State v. Smith, No. 91-5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1991).
182. Mr. Smith did not have sexual intercourse with Ms. Gulledge or Ms. Lattes, the other two
potential witnesses. It is questionable, therefore, whether these acts would be similar enough to the
charged crime to be admissible under Rule 404(b).
183. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 93.
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ever, tip in favor of admissibility in light of the importance of this evi-
dence to the prosecution's case.
185
V. CONCLUSION
Acquaintance rape is a difficult subject. Courts and individuals
generally do not want to believe such grotesque incidents occur during
everyday life. It is difficult to conceive of the severity of this problem.
Moreover, other societal issues and norms, such as morality, jealousy,
male domination, and women's rights, impact acquaintance rape cases.
Victims often do not file complaints because they believe that no one
will believe them or that rape cannot occur between two "friends." 18 6
Presently, acquaintance rape crimes are arduous to prosecute
because there are usually no witnesses. The case pits one person's word
against another's. Such problems make prior crimes evidence important
to validate the accusation. Other problems, such as the victim's possible
fabrication of the rape or a past victim's fabrication of a prior rape, may
weigh against using prior acts to prove the actus reus or to corroborate.
Uncharged misconduct evidence is also a complicated issue.
1 87
Use of such evidence is one of the most litigated evidentiary issues.188
Concerns remain that "the distinction between character and
noncharacter theories of relevance is illusory; ... even the purportedly
noncharacter theories entail assumptions about the accused's tendencies
and disposition." 189  Moreover, commentators suggest that some
noncharacter theories of relevance threaten to engulf the entire exclu-
sionary rule.190
Subject to these considerations and questions of the appropriateness
of the entire character evidence prohibition, this Comment provides a
new framework for considering prior acts evidence in acquaintance rape
cases. Under this framework courts may admit relevant evidence that
would have been excluded because the "only" disputed issue in the case
is consent. Prosecutors may concentrate on the issue that prior acts evi-
dence proves the actus reus of the crime and, at the same time, avoid
characterizing the evidence under the rubric of an enumerated exception.
This Comment does not suggest that courts provide a special
185. "So long as the trial court retains the discretion to exclude evidence of other offenses,
after weighing the probative value of the ... evidence against its potential prejudicial effect, the
court's determination of admissibility would not seem to violate any principles of justice or
fairness toward the defendant." Block, supra note 12, at 290.
186. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
188. See Imwinkelried, supra note 89, at 577.
189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 89.
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"acquaintance rape disposition" exception to allow admission of evi-
dence of prior acquaintance rapes. Nevertheless, perhaps re-evaluation
of rape law would lead to the separation of acquaintance rape and stran-
ger rape, thereby making the body of law on the "new" crime of
acquaintance rape a little more coherent.
SHERI B. Ross
